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From the Caribbean to Craignish: Imperial Authority and Piratical Voyages in the 
Early-Eighteenth-Century Atlantic Commons 
Abstract: 
 
Whereas seventeenth-century piracy has been recognized as an integrated component of the 
developing European Atlantic world, eighteenth-century pirates have been marginalized as an 
isolated group with little ties to landed communities. Such evaluations have stressed the 
heightened extension of state authority to the colonial theatre in the eighteenth century and, 
by doing so, have overlooked how pirates continued to interact with colonial actors operating 
in contested and unclaimed regions throughout the Atlantic commons. It is imperative that 
the Atlantic commons is given full consideration in any discussion of Atlantic maritime 
activity as it was within these expanses that inter-imperial, inter-colonial, and cross-border 
colonial actors converged. This article utilizes the piratical voyage captained by Howell 
Davies (and later Bartholomew Roberts) to demonstrate that it was within this commons that 
eighteenth-century piratical voyages were sustained and facilitated through the forced 
acquisition of supplies, through markets for plundered goods, and through the opportunities 
available for dispersing amongst landed communities at the end of expeditions. Continued 
connections between colonial denizens and pirates in the eighteenth century compels a 
reassessment of pirates’ isolation to instead place them within the wider population of coastal 
traders, sojourning mariners, and marginal colonial settlers who existed both within and 
outside of the imperial framework espoused by state and colonial centers. Ultimately, this 
questions the overall ability of European states to regulate maritime traffic when vessels 
sailed out of sight of established colonial ports, and beyond the practical reach of imperial 
authority. 
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In February 1720, James Campbell of Stonefield, the Sheriff Depute for Argyllshire in 
Scotland, reported that an unknown vessel had been purposefully run aground in Loch 
Craignish on the mid-Argyll coast. Even more suspicious was the fact that the crew had 
deserted the ship, separated, and dispersed along several different roads. Campbell 
immediately sent search parties looking for the crew whilst going himself to search the ship. 
All he found on board, aside from some provisions, were scraps of a purposefully-torn 
journal. From the surviving notes of the journal, Campbell was able to determine with some 
degree of certainty that the vessel had come from North America’s New England coast. Over 
the next few days, approximately thirteen of the crew were rounded up and arrested between 
Craignish and Dunoon. Adding to the peculiarities surrounding the event, Campbell wrote 
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that moidores - a type of Portuguese gold coin - had been found on each man’s person. The 
captured crewmembers were imprisoned in Inveraray jail for questioning. Another eight 
crewmembers were later caught at various locations between Argyll and Glasgow and 
brought back to Inveraray. At first the prisoners claimed that they had been bound from 
Dartmouth to Newfoundland, but that they had been forced to sail into Loch Craignish after 
their vessel, the Eagle, had been damaged in a storm. Campbell wrote that, aside from these 
basic details, each of the men’s accounts were entirely inconsistent with one other. The 
reason behind this was quickly uncovered as, by the second examination, a number of the 
crew confessed to being pirates who had sailed under the commands of Howell Davies (or 
Davis) and Bartholomew Roberts, committing several piracies throughout the Atlantic 
Ocean.1 
The nineteen surviving confessions of these crewmembers, who had joined the 
expedition at various different times and places, provide detailed description of a piratical 
voyage initiated by mutiny on board a small trading sloop off the coast of Hispaniola in 
September 1718. The pirates then plundered shipping in Cape Verde, Africa, and Brazil, 
before a portion of the crew separated in order to sail to the northern coast of Ireland under 
the command of Walter Kennedy, an Irish mariner who had been part of the voyage from the 
outset. Upon reaching Ireland, the crew intended to disperse and return to their homes 
throughout Ireland and England. During their return voyage, however, a storm drove them off 
course and into Loch Craignish.2 The confessions of the captured crewmembers, alongside 
victim testimonies and colonial reports concerning the same pirate crew, offer a rare insight 
into the progression of and strategies employed during a piratical voyage, and these insights 
challenge the predominant understandings of early-eighteenth-century piracy. 
The activities of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Atlantic pirates have inspired 
countless general histories which have focused on the narratives of the rise of the buccaneers 
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in the mid-seventeenth-century Caribbean, the emergence of the Red Sea pirates in the 1690s, 
and the spread of Atlantic piracy after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). In these studies, pirates 
are positioned as an ‘other’ in the Atlantic world and are observed as operating beyond the 
fringes of colonial society.3 Similarly, the social and cultural history of piracy, when not 
interwoven with general histories, has produced some radical accounts of anti-state mariners 
who rejected their nations to create seemingly democratic communities.4 The view that 
pirates rejected social and cultural norms to create an alternative social order has continued 
this theory of 'otherness' and, in the process, has misinterpreted the role that piracy played in 
the development of the Atlantic world. In comparison, scholars who have placed piracy 
within the wider political and economic framework of the British Atlantic world have 
revealed the extensive assimilation of pirates with landed colonial communities and the 
subsequent impact that these connections had on colonial development and imperial politics 
in the seventeenth century. By examining the widespread connections between colonial 
officials, traders, settlers, and pirates, these studies have shown that pirates operated on and 
within the fringes of colonial society rather than in opposition or resistance to it.5 
While this research has firmly recast pirates as an integrated component of the 
seventeenth-century Atlantic world where piratical voyages were enabled and supported in 
colonial ports, the rise and decline of piracy in the period from 1716 to 1726 has not received 
the same level of scrutiny. Instead, it is suggested that eighteenth-century pirates operated 
within a hostile Atlantic world that no longer supported illicit maritime predation. From this 
perspective, piracy declined because of state manoeuvres that delegitimized peacetime 
commerce raiding, destroyed pirates, and stimulated the decline of colonial sponsorship of 
piracy.6 Hanna, in particular, has charted the process through which British colonies 
transformed from pirate nests into productive and self-sustaining communities that turned 
their backs on illicit maritime predation and became further connected to the metropole. This 
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transformation occurred when colonial merchants gained legal access to markets that had 
previously fallen under monopolistic control, particularly the African slave trade, in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As a result of these changes, Hanna argues, piracy 
was no longer a necessary and assimilated part of the Atlantic economy and could not be 
sustained.7  By stressing that pirate nests only transformed after peripheral communities 
accepted their place as part of a wider Atlantic empire, Hanna provides new weight to the 
argument that colonial support was central to the overall success of imperial policy as the 
British state was never in a position to effectively impose centralized administration over 
their Atlantic dominions.8 However, while it is clear that a more coherent and connected 
British Atlantic empire emerged as colonial communities became closely integrated with the 
metropole at the turn of the century, it is important not to overstate this point. Although 
colonial acceptance of state authority brought established port towns into a more coherent 
framework, this authority could not and did not extend far beyond the immediate shores of 
colonial centres. 
Instead, as excellent work by Benton, Hancock, Jarvis, and Koot has established, 
neither state nor colonial centres were able to meaningfully dictate Atlantic maritime activity 
and trade throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even though state authority 
extended to many colonial ports in the early eighteenth century, Atlantic commerce continued 
to be driven by a multitude of individual transactions that remained decentralized, self-
organized, and opportunistic, facilitated by transatlantic and trans-imperial markets and 
connections, irrespective of state mercantilist policies. Similar to the fact that the compliance 
and consent of each colonial centre was vital to the extension of state authority across the 
Atlantic, the obedience of maritime activity to the authority of colonial centres relied 
predominantly on individual behaviour. Colonists regularly chose to operate both within and 
outside of the legal commercial framework espoused by these centres as neither the 
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metropolitan state nor individual colonies had the available resources to patrol and regulate 
maritime activity throughout the Atlantic.9 Consequently, the extension of imperial authority 
over maritime spaces was limited to specific sea lanes rather than extensive ocean zones.10 In 
fact, there was immense difficulty securing even the immediate proximities of established 
colonies against piratical attacks and illicit trade due to the severe lack of state-provided 
maritime defence.11 Simply put, there was little capacity for the regulation of maritime 
activity when vessels sailed beyond colonial shores. As such, traders frequently violated 
mercantilist restrictions in favour of profit and opportunity.12 
This ad-hoc maritime activity took place in extranational maritime spaces that lay 
unclaimed or contested, particularly within the Greater Caribbean, where no European 
imperial officials resided to enforce imperial policy and restrictions; regions which Jarvis has 
termed the Atlantic commons. Here mariners periodically voyaged, and sometimes settled, in 
order to rake salt, salvage wrecks, hunt turtles, harvest marine resources, and smuggle goods. 
Pirates, too, exploited these spaces. However, the commons that pirates utilised existed not 
just in the contested and unclaimed regions of the Greater Caribbean, but also in the 
unprotected capes of North America, on the vulnerable coastlines of Africa, in peripheral 
European outposts throughout the Atlantic, and even in those spaces of the Indian Ocean 
where Atlantic mariners converged. To account for this, Jarvis’ commons framework is 
utilised here in its broadest sense to refer to the predominantly littoral expanses where 
European imperial authority did not extend but where European subjects interacted and 
assembled. These commons, although fully integrated into the decentralized and self-
organized Atlantic economy, existed beyond the oversight of state or colonial officials and, as 
such, were regularly overlooked in considerations of the Atlantic world.13 
These spaces have also been overlooked within considerations of eighteenth-century 
piracy. For example, when considering the transformation of pirate nests, Hanna states that 
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“where once pirates were accorded legitimacy or at least toleration, most colonial 
communities now considered them genuine outlaws.”14 Such assertions are accurate when 
referring to anti-piracy measures enacted from colonial centres in the early eighteenth 
century, but Hanna does not then evaluate how pirates’ segregation from colonial ports 
transformed the methods and strategies that pirates employed to initiate, sustain, and end their 
voyages. Instead, he focuses exclusively on anti-pirate attitudes and, in the process, aligns 
with prevailing views that eighteenth-century pirates became entirely isolated from colonial 
communities.15 When examined from the perspective of the commons, however, it becomes 
evident that interactions and encounters between pirates and colonists continued beyond the 
shores of established colonial ports. Rather than halting connections between pirates and 
landed communities altogether, the transformation of pirate nests pushed such interactions 
more fully into the realm of the Atlantic commons where imperial authority did not and could 
not extend. 
To date, there has been no detailed examination of how piratical voyages exploited 
the Atlantic commons to not only plunder but also interact with colonists and colonial 
communities. Even historians who have acknowledged that such interactions persisted well 
into the eighteenth century have not accounted for where and how this contact occurred. For 
example, Chet states that “Britons continued to engage in and support piratical and 
contraband trade despite efforts to delegitimize, outlaw, and suppress it in the eighteenth 
century” but does not then provide evidence or analysis of the means and methods of such 
support.16 One reason for this is the fragmented nature of evidence concerning early-
eighteenth-century piratical voyages in comparison to those of the seventeenth-century. That 
is not to say that seventeenth-century voyages are significantly easier to chart in their 
entirety, but that the ways in which piratical voyages predominantly began, outfitted, and 
concluded is more visible in the seventeenth century, when pirates were welcomed into and 
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operated from various colonial ports, than in the eighteenth century, when voyages began and 
ended in the unobserved spaces of the Atlantic commons. As a result, the information 
concerning most eighteenth-century piratical voyages is incredibly piecemeal and hard to 
verify.17 The voyage discussed within this article provides a rare exception as it can be 
charted from its beginning through to its multiple conclusions by making use of the 
crewmembers’ confessions, which are more numerous and detailed than those concerning the 
majority of other piratical voyages. Furthermore, the detail provided within these multiple 
confessions has made it possible to compile a wide range of victim testimonies and colonial 
reports that concern this same crew, and which verifies and reinforces information provided 
by the captured crewmembers. 
By charting the activities of the Eagle’s crew, the methods and strategies employed 
throughout the duration of their voyage can be observed. These can then be compared and 
contrasted with the fragmentary evidence available concerning other piratical voyages to 
provide an overview of the ways in which pirates utilised the Atlantic commons to plunder, 
trade, and disperse. The continued assimilation of pirates with these spaces calls into question 
the dominant assessment that eighteenth-century pirates, as opposed to their seventeenth-
century counterparts, were an isolated collective that operated far beyond the fringes of 
colonial society. While such an examination offers new understanding of the progression of 
eighteenth-century piratical voyages, it also provides reflection on the sheer limitations of 
state and colonial authority over Atlantic maritime activity. Even when pirates were displaced 
from colonial ports in the early eighteenth century, they remained integrated with those 
maritime spaces that lay beyond the practical reach of imperial authority. 
 
Plundering the Atlantic commons  
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When pirates were no longer welcomed in the port towns of the Atlantic, the means through 
which they could outfit, man, and arm vessels was limited. Although pirates’ inability to 
operate from colonial ports has been employed by historians to demonstrate that colonial 
communities had transformed and rejected piracy, there has been only brief discussion of the 
methods that mariners then employed to undertake piratical voyages.18 Unable to outfit from 
colonial ports, pirates turned to spaces where they could gain the necessary resources to 
facilitate their operations. In particular, they sought provisions to sustain their voyage, 
recruits to bolster the strength of their crew, and better-equipped crafts with which they could 
hope to successfully engage and capture sizeable prizes carrying significant plunder. The 
Atlantic commons provided pirates with both the necessary recruiting grounds and a vast 
repository of provisions, supplies, nautical stores, and vessels which could be requisitioned 
for their purposes. By examining the regions and goods that Davies’ and Roberts’ pirate crew 
targeted, it is possible to understand how this piratical voyage, and others like it, endured and 
thrived within the Atlantic commons. That they were able to do so at a time when state and 
colonial centres were actively opposing piratical activity points to the limits of imperial reach 
within the maritime spaces that connected and surrounded their territorial possessions. 
 Throughout their expeditions, pirates primarily operated in those regions of the 
Atlantic commons where shipping congregated but that were either contested, unclaimed, or 
unprotected by the imperial powers. The overall shortage of naval vessels in the colonial 
theatre meant that these regions were not regularly patrolled and, even if naval vessels were 
sent in quest of pirates, their information was often outdated. On the occasion that pirates 
were encountered, large naval ships were frequently unable to pursue small pirate vessels 
through shoals and shallow waters and, as such, proved ineffective in suppressing them.19 
Despite their overall failure to directly suppress pirates, the presence of naval ships stationed 
in ports, alongside their active convoying of trading vessels engaged in the most profitable 
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colonial trades, meant that encountering and capturing vessels near significant colonial ports 
and throughout the principal colonial shipping routes proved problematic for pirates.20 In 
response, they turned to those areas where trading vessels were employed but that were left 
vulnerable without armed convoys or coastal fortifications. 
The activities of Davies’ and Roberts’ crew reflect this experience. After committing 
mutiny on board the Buck, a trading sloop outfitted from New Providence, off the coast of 
Hispaniola in September 1718, the crew primarily cruised on the uninhabited and undefended 
stretches of the Hispaniola coastline, reportedly voyaging to similar locales in Cuba. During 
this time, they preyed on small coastal vessels which offered little or no defence rather than 
attempting to seize larger shipping near the defended ports.21 From Hispaniola, Davies and 
the crew voyaged to Maio in the Cape Verde Islands. Although under Portuguese authority, 
Maio was an undefended peripheral island where foreign traders from European and colonial 
waters regularly sailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to take advantage of the 
island’s sizeable saltpans. The lack of defence at Maio meant that it also became a regular 
rendezvous for pirates and privateers who preyed on shipping loading salt at Maio as well as 
commercial vessels entering and exiting the nearby island of Santiago.22 Next, Davies’ crew 
turned to Africa where they committed depredations in Gambia River, Sierra Leone, 
Anomabu, and the Portuguese islands of Príncipe and Annobón in the Gulf of Guinea and 
gained supplies, recruits, and superior vessels.23 During their time on the western African 
coast, the crew faced little opposition as European warships rarely patrolled the expanses of 
the African coast and, aside from the numerous European forts positioned along the Gold 
Coast, there was little effective defence throughout the majority of the coastline. This meant 
that slaving vessels proved particularly vulnerable to piratical attacks.24 
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Figure 1. Map showing the pirates’ expedition from Hispaniola to Salvation’s Island  
 
Throughout the majority of their voyage, the pirates had targeted shipping in exposed 
regions where they encountered little or no opposition. These spaces lay either unclaimed or 
undefended by imperial and local powers and instead were well-trafficked littoral commons 
where Europeans vessels could gather resources and transact with resident brokers, whether 
European or African, away from the conclaves of imperial control. Likewise, these were 
regions where European traders could expect little protection from external threats. On 
turning to Brazil, however, Davies and the crew targeted Portuguese treasure ships which 
were well-armed, sailed in great fleets, and were convoyed by Portuguese warships.25 This 
seems to have been their ultimate target. The pirates had purposefully utilized undefended 
shipping routes throughout the Atlantic commons as the means through which to outfit and 
prepare for a voyage against better-defended prizes in richer cruising grounds by 
concentrating on the acquisition of three key assets: supplies, recruits, and a superior vessel. 
 After seizing the Buck, the pirates spent approximately five or six weeks in and 
around Hispaniola, where they plundered at least three sloops and several small vessels 
described as being “of no consequence.”26 At this point, the crew were not seeking valuable 
prizes but, instead, plundered these vessels for provisions and supplies which they needed to 
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stockpile in order to undertake their intended cruise to Africa.27 In fact, throughout this entire 
voyage, the majority of vessels that were taken by the crew were plundered for their 
provisions before being dismissed without further harm.28 For example, of the twenty-one 
reported piracies in which Davies’ crew were involved on the west coast of Africa: fifteen 
vessels were plundered and dismissed, three were burned, and three were carried off by the 
pirates.29 John Bennett, captain of the Robert and Jane which was taken by the crew at Maio, 
reported that the pirates removed “the greatest part of her Cargoe which consisted of several 
Chests of fire Arms, several Bails of India Goods & Perpetuanas, severals Casks of Rum, 
some Powder, & all his ships Gunns being eight in number.”30 Other goods that the pirates 
plundered included clothes and water, alongside whatever money and valuable trading goods 
could be found on board. Likewise, the crew looted supplies from the Royal African 
Company’s (hereafter RAC) factories in Gambia River and in Sierra Leone which were then 
burned and destroyed. These supplies, particularly provisions and water, were vital for 
ensuring the sustenance of the crew during their voyage whilst firearms and powder provided 
additional firepower which could be utilized to enact further piracies. While money and 
trading goods were also seized and divided between the crew, this was not the primary 
motivation behind these depredations.31 The pirates were gaining the means through which to 
continue their voyage and undertake the passage to richer cruising grounds. Importantly, it 
was not just supplies that the crew sought. Although the majority of the pirates’ depredations 
took place on the African coast, it was not the specific cargoes of slaving vessels that the 
crew desired. Instead, Africa provided a necessary sojourn for pirates seeking recruits and 
larger ships. 
 For almost every vessel that was taken by Davies’ crew, there is an account that men 
from the captured vessel either voluntarily joined or were pressed into the pirate crew. Of 
those members of the crew who were apprehended at Argyll, each had been taken at various 
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times from different ships. For example, Rodger Hughs, a sailor from Whitechapel, had 
sailed from London to New Providence on the Buck and was on board when the mutiny 
occurred whereas William Fenton, a shipwright from Wapping, was taken whilst on board the 
Morris sloop at Anomabu in Ghana.32 Another two vessels were seized at Anomabu, the 
Royal Hind and Princess, and it was reported that the pirates took “as many of their Crew as 
they thought fit for their purpose” before dismissing the rest with their vessel.33 A number of 
other crewmembers were recruited or pressed from vessels seized at Hispaniola, Maio, 
Gambia River, and Sierra Leone.34 
Although all of the crewmembers apprehended at Argyll claimed to have been forced 
into the pirates’ service, it is clear that this was not entirely the case. Distinguishing between 
those who were forced and those who were not is problematic, and sometimes impossible, as 
those who were forced to join and attempted to resist were often threatened and beaten until 
they became active members of the crew. However, the exceptional amount of evidence 
concerning this individual voyage makes it possible to confirm with a relative degree of 
certainty that some of those caught in Argyll had clearly attempted to resist participating in 
the crews’ actions, either through fleeing when on shore or by refusing to assist during 
engagements, while others had willingly joined when their ships were taken and later claimed 
they had been forced in a bid to gain mercy.35 One clear case of this is John Clerk, a sailor 
from Bangor in the northeast of Ireland, who claimed he had been forced into the pirates’ 
service at Hispaniola whilst on board a Philadelphia trading sloop. The testimonies of both 
Archibald Murray and Rodger Hughs, who were present on the Buck during the mutiny, 
refute this claim and suggest that Clerk was one of the original mutineers. It seems Clerk had 
in fact joined the crew at New Providence, and it is likely that he was a former New 
Providence pirate who had accepted amnesty when the British state offered a blanket pardon 
to any pirates who surrendered between September 1717 and July 1719.36 Moreover, a “John 
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Clarke” appears in a list of New Providence pirates who had surrendered themselves to a 
Royal Navy captain in July 1718 and it is probable, although by no means certain, that this 
was Clerk.37 Whether he was an active mutineer or a pardoned pirate forced back into 
service, Clerk had attempted to conceal his presence on board the Buck at the time of the 
original mutiny in order to further his defence and advance his potential prospects of gaining 
mercy. Clerk’s case is just one example of the difficulties involved in establishing the truth 
behind many pirates’ testimonies. 
In this case, it is clear that a number of sailors both signed onto and were forced into 
Davies’ crew in various undefended locales throughout Africa. Whereas the mutiny had 
started with just thirteen men, the crew had grown in size to between 100 and 130 men when 
the pirates left the African coast bound for Brazil in the latter half of 1719.38 There was a 
variety of reasons why mariners may have chosen to join Davies’ crew from lawful trading 
voyages throughout the Atlantic commons, including the harsh discipline of individual 
merchant captains, meagre wages, and the promise of future economic gain.39 While 
crewmembers were also recruited in Hispaniola and Maio, Africa provided the primary 
recruiting ground for Davies’ crew. Indeed, sailors engaged on slaving voyages proved 
particularly willing to join pirate crews as an alternative to their present employment in the 
early eighteenth century. One Royal Navy captain, Francis Willis, who was dispatched to 
Africa in 1720, reported that mariners in Africa were “ripe for piracy” but could not judge 
whether this was “occasion[e]d by the Masters ill usuage or their own natural inclinations.”40 
As discussed by Janzen, there were similar discussions of pirates who voyaged to 
Newfoundland in the 1720s in order to refit and where stragglers, keen to escape the harsh 
conditions of Newfoundland or who had been indebted due to unproductive fishing seasons 
and unpaid wages, were recruited into pirate crews.41 Whether forced or otherwise, recruits 
gained from lawful trading voyages and peripheral communities throughout the Atlantic 
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commons were vital to bolstering pirate crews and enabled them to operate larger vessels and 
pursue greater prizes.42 
Alongside restricting access to supplies and recruits, seclusion from colonial ports 
meant that pirates did not have access to shipping outfitted for the express purposes of 
piratical cruises, but instead needed to acquire shipping elsewhere in order to begin their 
voyages. In the early eighteenth century, mutiny provided one of the principal means to 
achieve this. Yet, successful mutinies often occurred in trading vessels of limited tonnage 
whose smaller crews were easier to overpower by revolting crewmembers. In order to target 
lucrative shipping in well defended locales, pirates needed to then capture a larger vessel that 
could be outfitted with bigger crews and greater firepower. Such activity has been recognised 
in previous studies, but these have provided little specific evidence or analysis of the step-by-
step progression that occurred from pirates’ acquisition of small crafts to the eventual 
procurement of vessels strong enough to attack significant prizes. This is primarily because 
the fragmentary evidence surrounding eighteenth-century piratical voyages means that 
tracking and verifying such progression on a case-by-case basis is problematic.43 However, 
there is enough evidence to trace the sequence of this crew from one vessel to another 
throughout their voyage, and this provides new insight into the methods of early-eighteenth-
century piracy. 
The mutineers on board the Buck were reported to have been previously pardoned 
pirates from New Providence. It seems that they exploited the opportunity to join the trading 
voyage to Hispaniola as the means through which to gain a vessel to begin another piratical 
cruise.44  The Buck was a small vessel of seventy-five tons that mounted only six guns. It was 
suitable for plundering vessels of similar size and strength, particularly vessels employed on 
inter-imperial and inter-colonial trade on colonial coasts, but lacked the firepower that could 
be utilized against ships of greater tonnage carrying substantial plunder.45 As such, they 
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turned to Africa in quest of large poorly-defended slaving vessels that could be outfitted for 
their purposes. This was communicated to the Admiralty in 1720 by London-based slave 
traders who informed: 
 
It hath been found by fatal Experience That the pirates when they are pursued or 
forsake the West Indies, do not faile to come to the Coast of Africa, in order to supply 
themselves with good sailing ships well furnished with Ammunition, provisions, & 
stores of all kinds, fitt for long Voyages.46 
 
In 1719, when Davies and the crew were cruising in Africa, a range of vessels were 
employed in slaving voyages on the African coast. These varied considerably in type and size 
from small sloops of thirty tons to large frigates of up to 400 tons. The number of cannons 
recorded on these varied anywhere between two and twenty-eight guns, and it is likely that 
larger vessels mounted at least thirty-six guns.47 The pirates sought to upgrade their small 
craft to one of these vessels in order to allow for a larger crew and superior firepower. 
However, to successfully engage and capture slaving vessels, particularly those mounted with 
a large number of cannons, the pirates first needed to transfer to a better-equipped vessel than 
the small Buck sloop. The Cape Verde islands provided an exposed locale in which such a 
vessel could be captured en route to Africa. Whilst at Maio, the crew of the Buck captured 
three vessels: the Loyal Merchant of Liverpool, the Merry Thought of Lisbon, and the Robert 
& Jane of London. The Merry Thought and Robert & Jane were dismissed while the Loyal 
Merchant was kept and renamed the King James.48 The tonnage of the King James is not 
recorded but it was described as a large ship.49 Whatever its size, it was clearly a superior 
ship to the Buck and capable of carrying more guns and a larger crew. Furthermore, whilst in 
the River Gambia, the crew employed the increased firepower of the King James to 
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successfully attack and destroy the RAC’s fort in the river, taking between nine and twelve 
cannons which were subsequently mounted on the King James to again increase the pirates’ 
overall strength.50 The next ship captured and outfitted was the Marquis de Campo, a frigate 
belonging to Ostend, which was taken between Sierra Leone and Anomabu. This was a small 
frigate of 100 tons, which seems to have been a similar size to the King James, but was 
deemed “the better ship mounting about Thirty two Guns.”51 As such, the full crew 
transferred from the King James to the Marquis de Campo, renamed the Rover or Royal 
Rover.52 The Rover, stocked with provisions, manned with a large crew of voluntary and 
involuntary recruits, and outfitted with at least thirty-two cannons, proceeded to Brazil in 
quest of a wealthy prize.  
From the original mutiny on board a small sloop off the coast of Hispaniola, the 
pirates had continually increased in number whilst stocking up on necessary supplies and 
trading up to larger vessels captured throughout the Atlantic commons. It is uncertain 
whether the objective had always been to attack the Portuguese treasure fleet but it is clear 
that the pirates’ basic intention was to proceed to a location where they could pursue a 
substantial prize. This was also the case of other pirate crews who cruised on the African 
coast and then continued to the Indian Ocean.53 From Africa, the crew of the Rover – who 
had elected Bartholomew Roberts as captain after Davies had died at Príncipe – stopped at 
the island of Fernando de Noronha and then sailed along the Brazilian coast for about six 
weeks before encountering a Portuguese treasure fleet of forty-two ships, convoyed by two 
men of war. The pirates captured two vessels from the Portuguese fleet, one of which was a 
substantial ship of 400 tons carrying an abundance of moidores and gold dust.54 The plunder 
from this prize was estimated to value between sixteen and eighteen thousand pound, and 
proved to be one of the most substantial hauls of the early eighteenth century.55 The 
provisions, recruits, and superior ship that the pirates had accumulated throughout their 
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voyage proved vital to this success. The supplies enabled the pirates to cruise on the Brazilian 
coast for six weeks in anticipation of the treasure fleet, while their overall strength facilitated 
success when the fleet was encountered. The captured Portuguese treasure ship had been 
mounted with at least thirty-two guns which meant that it matched the Rover in firepower and 
likely contained a similar number of men. In order to quickly engage and capture the 
Portuguese treasure ship before the warships and other vessels of the fleet came to their aid, 
the pirates needed a vessel of similar strength that could hastily subdue their prize. In this 
case, the Portuguese ship surrendered after one broadside and a volley of small shot while 
only one man was killed and two wounded from the pirate’s crew.56 Likewise, after capturing 
the vessel, the pirates immediately fled with their prize to Salvation’s Island (referred to as 
Triangles) off the coast of French Guiana, successfully outrunning the Portuguese men-of-
war that pursued them. This would not have been achievable without a sizeable crew that was 
capable of sailing both vessels. 
There were few other comparable successes in this period as the majority of pirate 
crews either did not voyage to these better-defended locales or were unsuccessful when they 
did. It is notable that the other two significant prizes reported during the early eighteenth 
century were taken in the Indian Ocean by pirates who had undertaken a similar voyage to 
Davies’ crew. Christopher Condent, who had sailed in the Caribbean before directing to the 
Indian Ocean, captured the Faza Ramance, a rich Arab trader travelling from Jeddah, while 
Richard Taylor and La Buse, who had sailed in consort with Davies at Sierra Leone, captured 
the Nossa Senhora do Cabo, a large Portuguese vessel carrying the Viceroy of Goa and a 
substantial quantity of treasure back to Portugal. In all of these cases, the pirates had 
benefitted through the supplies, recruits, and shipping that could be plundered from 
commercial vessels and locales throughout the Atlantic commons.57  
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It is important to recognize that even those crews that did not undertake lengthy 
voyages to Brazil or the Indian Ocean, and instead focused on small-scale raids on shipping 
in the Caribbean Sea and North American coastline, also utilized the Atlantic commons in 
similar ways. Rather than seeking one large prize in distant waters, these crews exploited the 
unprotected expanses of the Atlantic to gradually profit through multiple piracies on small 
trading vessels. They concentrated their efforts in contested and vulnerable spaces such as the 
Bahamas, Bay Islands, and Virgin Islands where traders engaged in a variety of enterprises 
and also preyed on unprotected shipping near unguarded capes and along vulnerable stretches 
of coastline in North America. At the same time, they used these extranational maritime 
spaces to supply, recruit, and seize vessels that were deemed better-suited for their 
purposes.58 
Therefore, the Atlantic commons was exploited to initiate and sustain piratical 
voyages, whether for long-ranging voyages or localised attacks, and this highlights both the 
specific impact that the closure of colonial ports had on piratical voyages as well as the 
alternative opportunities available to them in spaces outside of imperial control. By looking 
purely at the depredations outlined here, however, it could be argued that pirates were acting 
in opposition to maritime activity throughout the Atlantic commons. In this regard, they 
could be considered as an ‘other’ in this space because they indiscriminately attacked 
shipping of all nations and, as a result, were rejected by the majority of established colonial 
centres. Doing so, however, would be to overlook the fact that piracy reflects the very nature 
of Atlantic maritime activity which was dictated not by state power but through the ad-hoc 
decisions of groups and individuals who exploited this vast maritime theatre to make their 
fortune.59 This is demonstrated not only by those mariners who mutinied or willingly joined 
pirates from lawful voyages, but also by the wide range of actors throughout the Atlantic who 
aided and abetted pirates in order to reap the benefits of their plunder.  
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Trading in the Atlantic commons 
 
Despite the transformation of pirate nests charted by Hanna, and the apparent isolation of 
pirates advanced within the wider historiography, there are several accounts of commercial 
transactions occurring between pirates, traders, and settlers in the early eighteenth century. 
This trade predominantly took place in the remote inlets and islands of the Atlantic commons, 
where colonial traders and local settlers rendezvoused with pirates and took advantage of a 
high-risk, opportunistic trade. Similar to inter-imperial and inter-island trade, this was a 
largely invisible trade, taking place without any centre, and occurring in-between the spaces 
of state or colonial oversight. As such, the volume and scale of commerce between pirates 
and colonial actors is difficult to measure.60 Nevertheless, it is possible to demonstrate that 
this trade did occur and that it was potentially endemic. This challenges the dominant view 
that eighteenth-century pirates operated without any support from colonial communities, 
while also providing novel demonstration of the nature of Atlantic maritime activity when 
vessels sailed beyond and in-between imperial centres. 
Davies’ crew traded with peripheral actors on at least two separate occasions and it is 
almost certain that there were additional transactions that went unrecorded. In April 1719, 
Robert Plunkett, the RAC agent for Sierra Leone, stated: 
 
That ye pirates have meet w[i]th such reception there [Sierra Leone] that it is become 
a place of Rende[z]vous for them there being so many Rascalls on shore that assist 
them w[i]th Boats & Cannoes to bring their goods on shore and likewise Encourage 
them in all Manner of Villiany.61 
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The pirates complained of were the crews of Cocklyn, Davies, and La Buse who sailed in 
consort in Sierra Leone for several weeks.62 During this time, it is clear that a number of 
transactions had taken place between the pirates and resident British traders who maintained 
private commercial outposts on the shores of Sierra Leone River.63 It was reported that these 
traders sent boats to the pirates’ ships which returned “loaden with goods & Liquors.”64 
Although some of the masters of the plundered vessels recovered a portion of their goods 
from the traders after the pirates had departed,  it was suspected that the traders kept the bulk 
of the plunder.65 The second occasion reported occurred at the Portuguese island of Príncipe 
where Davies traded with the Portuguese. One of the crewmembers reported that Davies 
landed multiple times at Príncipe with a number of his men and, on at least one occasion, 
returned with provisions.66 
It was Davies’ dealings at Príncipe that led to his death. There are conflicting 
accounts as to what transpired but a disagreement arose either between Davies and the 
governor, or between Davies and the inhabitants of the island, which resulted in the 
inhabitants firing upon and killing Davies and the crewmembers who had accompanied 
him.67 Peter Cheap, who served as supercargo on board the Loyalty of Glasgow which visited 
Príncipe shortly after the pirates had departed, reported that the governor of Príncipe had 
divulged that the conflict occurred after he had required money for the provisions he had 
given Davies. This had motivated Davies to land armed men and resulted in the skirmish.68 
Another account appeared much later in a publication by William Snelgrave, who was 
captain of a ship captured by Davies in Sierra Leone, which claimed that the governor 
launched a surprise attack on the pirates after he feared repercussions for trading with them.69 
Whatever the case, it is apparent that prior to the skirmish the Portuguese governor had at 
least suspected that Davies and the crew were pirates but still permitted them to purchase 
provisions at Príncipe. As Príncipe was under the direct authority of the Portuguese and ruled 
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by an appointed governor, it cannot be considered part of the contested or unclaimed Atlantic 
commons. Yet, that the governor was willing to transact with pirates when they arrived at the 
island is indicative of the fact that there remained peripheral European outposts throughout 
the Atlantic where imperial officials and inhabitants were willing to trade with pirates when it 
proved beneficial.  Such interactions remained, for the most part, hidden from official record 
so that it is rare to uncover evidence of this commerce. Indeed, the only reason that verifiable 
evidence survives of this specific transaction is because such interactions had led to conflict 
between the pirates and the inhabitants, and this was reported in various sources. However, 
when the evidence regarding this voyage is paired with comparable anecdotal evidence, the 
persistence of commercial interactions between pirates and colonists, whether carried out in 
the ports of peripheral outposts or throughout the Atlantic commons, becomes harder to 
disregard as exceptional. 
There are reports of various groups of Europeans actively aiding and supporting 
pirates throughout the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the early eighteenth century. Traders 
from established colonies, including Jamaica and Bermuda, who were engaged in inter-
imperial and inter-colonial trades were reported to exchange goods for piratical plunder when 
the opportunity arose in spaces beyond colonial ports.70 This was outlined by the lieutenant 
governor of Bermuda, John Hope, who wrote “the great good of these people (is what they 
call) a maroon life: This is wandering from one uninhabited Island to another (in their 
sloops), fishing for wrecks, and trading with pyrat’s, and living not like animals that are 
imbued with reason.71” In an earlier account, he had reported: 
 
There is such a correspondence betwixt the pyrates and those people that go from 
hence [Bermuda] (as well as from the other Plantations) to those Islands where they 
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pretend to rake salt, that except there be some effectual remedy fall[e]n upon to break 
off that intercourse these parts will always swarm with those vermin.72 
 
It is important to note that reports of this illicit trade were often given without specific 
evidence and were written by colonial officials and mercantile actors who used these 
accounts as a means to vilify local opposition, although there is enough additional evidence 
to suggest that such a trade did take place. Alongside this ship-based trade, there is existing 
evidence that pirates transacted with peripheral outposts and remote settlements. In addition 
to the account of Davies trading at Príncipe, there is at least one other account of pirates 
gaining provisions at marginal European outposts when the crews of the Cassandra and 
Victory traded with merchants from the Dutch fort at Kochi on India’s Malabar coast.73 Other 
accounts relate that Europeans who had settled and cultivated land in sites of little state or 
colonial oversight, such as the outlying islands of the Virgin Islands, were active accomplices 
of pirates.74 
It is difficult to assess how far engaging in this commerce was a choice made by 
colonial traders and settlers or whether this was a forced trade driven by apprehensions of the 
superior strength of pirates. For example, Captain Knott, whose vessel was taken in the 
Caribbean, reported that pirates plundered all of his sea stores and, in recompense, gave him 
sugar, tobacco, and moidores. This appears to be a reliable account as Knott did not attempt 
to conceal these dealings, but instead immediately reported it to the Virginian governor on 
arrival and relinquished the plundered goods.75 On the other hand, there is substantial proof 
that traders who were engaged in the Madagascan slave trade proactively transacted with the 
few sets of pirates who voyaged to the Indian Ocean in the early eighteenth century.76 
Overall, the available evidence provided by first-hand testimonies, pirate depositions, and the 
accounts of individuals who were caught trading with pirates suggests that colonial and 
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peripheral actors were both complicit and forced at different times on a case-by-case basis.77 
Although the volume of this trade is impossible to measure, it is clear that wherever pirates 
travelled, there was a contingent of traders and inhabitants who were both willing and forced 
to trade with them. In turn, these abettors benefitted from the exorbitant prices they could 
charge pirates; they were able to gain a share of illicit plunder without the risks of 
undertaking a piratical voyage.78 
 The fact that contact persisted between pirates, colonists, and settlers despite the 
decline of open colonial sponsorship at the turn of the century provides a clear demonstration 
of the limitations of state and colonial authority over Atlantic maritime activity. While Royal 
Navy vessels voyaged in search of pirates, and colonial centres outfitted vessels to counteract 
pirates impacting local trade, colonial traders continued to transact with pirates in peripheral 
locales. This interplay between compliance and defiance is exemplified by the attempts to 
protect Jamaican trade from pirates in the 1720s. In 1722, the Jamaican assembly, with the 
full support of the governor and council, passed an act which provided funds to employ a 
sloop to guard the Jamaican coast from pirates.79 In 1724, it was reported that outfitting 
guard-ships cost Jamaican planters “an annuall Expence of £5000 a year & sometimes 
Double.”80 While private guard-ships were engaged to protect the immediate coastlines, 
Royal Navy vessels assigned to Jamaica actively convoyed Jamaican merchant ships 
employed in the profitable Anglo-Spanish contraband trade which centred on the Honduran 
coast. Jamaican merchants requested Royal Navy protection after pirates operating from the 
Bay Islands – Guanaja, Roatán, and Útila – posed a significant threat to this trade; the islands 
lay in close proximity to Trujillo, one of the key contraband entrepots.81 At the same time, 
Ellis Brand, a Royal Navy captain stationed at Jamaica, complained that pirates at the Bay 
Islands were supported by individuals in Jamaica who “send from hence to there reliefe”, a 
practice which he feared was widely practiced.82 In this example, Jamaican actors both aided 
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and discouraged pirates dependent on the impact of piracy on their own activities. Guardships 
were outfitted to discourage pirates from attacking shipping on local Jamaican coasts, naval 
vessels were utilised to protect Jamaican vessels engaged in contraband trade on the 
Honduran coast, while other traders took advantage of the opportunity to gain piratical 
plunder by trading with pirates operating from the Bay Islands. This was the result of the 
multifaceted nature of colonial maritime activity in which traders were engaged in a variety 
of trades occurring at various locales throughout the Atlantic commons whilst state resources 
were employed to protect profitable colonial trades, and colonial resources were expended to 
protect local shipping in immediate vicinities. 
All of the transactions between pirates and traders outlined here demonstrate the 
changing nature of plunder markets in the eighteenth century when the plunder trade could no 
longer be managed in colonial ports. This, in turn, meant that such interactions relied on 
spontaneous and opportunistic encounters. Indeed, the fact that pirates could no longer expect 
to receive colonial support or investment at the beginning of voyages but, instead, could only 
hope to transact with traders after they had plundered desirable goods points to pirates’ 
diminishing options in the early eighteenth century.  Nevertheless, although pirates’ ability to 
find willing buyers was never guaranteed, such markets persisted throughout the vast and 
unpatrolled hinterland of the Atlantic commons wherever there were traders and settlers for 
whom the benefits of gaining plunder outweighed the risks of trading with pirates. The 
sustained connections between pirates and colonists within these spaces needs to receive 
wider recognition within the historiography. Otherwise, the separation of pirates from 
colonial communities appears much more rigid than it was in reality.  This does not refute 
that perceptions towards piracy changed in the eighteenth century, but that such perceptions 
were more complex than has been heretofore recognised and this reflects the impromptu 
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nature of maritime activity occurring outside of state and colonial centres and beyond the 
reach of imperial authority. 
 
Dispersing throughout the Atlantic commons 
 
For the most part, piracy was not expected to be a lifelong occupation but was, instead, part 
of a long and varied maritime career. McDonald has argued this point, outlining that there 
was a “spectrum of piracy” which contained, at one end, mariners whose lifetime occupation 
was piracy and, at the other end, mariners who committed a single act of piracy throughout 
their career. Found in-between these two extremes were a range of individuals who 
committed multiple piracies throughout their maritime careers, and who made up the bulk of 
the population.83 Fundamental to this vocational fluidity was that pirates were welcomed 
back into colonial communities at the end of voyages, where they could then settle down or 
undertake alternative maritime employment. In the seventeenth century, extensive colonial 
support of piracy meant that this was an entirely realistic expectation.84 However, as open 
sponsorship of piracy declined in the eighteenth century, so too did pirates’ options for re-
entering colonial society. As Hanna states, “no longer could a successful pirate cruise into the 
Delaware Bay, dine with the governor, marry his daughter, and settle down to a pleasant life 
on land.”85 Yet, although pirates could no longer expect to sail into colonial ports and receive 
welcome from the colonial gentry, they continued to re-enter colonial communities by other 
means. This was by no means impossible nor exceptional. However, the historiography 
provides only brief examination of how pirates achieved this, and such discussion focuses on 
evaluating the success of royal pardons.86 Moving beyond state-driven pardons, the detailed 
evidence surrounding the dispersal of various crewmembers of the Rover after their success 
on the Brazilian coast provides a unique glimpse into the various strategies that pirates used 
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to return to colonial communities. These activities further expose that connections between 
pirates and landed communities persisted in the eighteenth century, and that such connections 
regularly exploited the lack of imperial surveillance throughout the Atlantic commons.  
Following the capture of the Portuguese ship, Roberts’ crew separated into several 
different groups who concluded their voyages at various different times and places. Roberts 
and around forty of the crew left the Rover, manned a sloop that had been captured at 
Salvations’ Island, and proceeded in quest of another vessel that had been spotted. This group 
continued their piratical voyage, committing numerous depredations in the Caribbean, North 
America, and Newfoundland, before being defeated by the Royal Navy at Cape Lopez on the 
west coast of Africa in early 1722.87 The remaining crew of the Rover, detailed as being 
between fifty-eight and seventy-six men, sailed from Salvation’s Island to Barbados under 
the command of Walter Kennedy. Near Barbados, Kennedy’s crew captured the Eagle and 
Kennedy transferred into the vessel with forty-seven of the crew; five later joined a Boston 
brigantine that was headed to Barbados, and the rest directed for Britain, ending up in 
Craignish.88 Of the remaining crew of the Rover, eight took passage on board a trading vessel 
to Virginia, five were put ashore at Anguilla, and the rest carried the Rover to Saint 
Thomas.89 The multiple conclusions of this voyage demonstrate the methods pirates 
employed to re-enter landed society and also highlight the varied outcomes of eighteenth-
century piratical voyages. 
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Figure 2. Map showing pirates’ dispersal after Salvation’s Island 
 
While Roberts’ defeat at Cape Lopez in 1722 was a substantial victory for the Royal 
Navy, it was one of only a handful of naval victories over pirates in the early eighteenth 
century. In general, the Royal Navy were ineffective in directly suppressing Atlantic piracy. 
The shortage of naval vessels assigned to extra-European spaces and their overall failure to 
suppress pirates motivated colonial governments to outfit private vessels in small-scale 
reactive expeditions with the aim of discouraging pirates impacting local trade. These too 
achieved few direct successes. Individually, naval and colonial anti-piracy operations enacted 
little direct change but, collectively, they gradually eliminated a number of Atlantic pirates 
and created a more hostile environment for pirates to operate within.90 Likewise, the public 
spectacles of pirate executions, the exhibition of convicted pirates’ bodies in port towns, and 
widely publicised and disseminated accounts of the direct successes against pirates presented 
the potential stakes of committing piracy in order to discourage mariners from turning pirate 
 29 
in the future.91 Nevertheless, the levels of pirate activity in the early eighteenth century 
compared to the number of pirates who were caught and convicted suggests that a significant 
portion of mariners who had sailed on piratical voyages, and who did not die due to disease 
or conflict, dispersed back into colonial or European communities.92 While direct and indirect 
measures to suppress piracy provided additional motivation for active pirates to disband, it 
was opportunities within the wider Atlantic commons that facilitated their dispersal.  
One means for re-entering landed communities was by obtaining exoneration from 
colonial governments, either through the blanket pardons intermittently offered by imperial 
powers or by soliciting for amnesty from potentially welcoming ports. Several pirates 
accepted the British pardon that was active between September 1717 and July 1719, while 
others voyaged to French colonies, such as Martinique and Hispaniola, to take advantage of 
the French pardon that was first offered in 1716 and remained active in the 1720s.93 Beyond 
these blanket pardons, pirate crews also sought amnesty at various locations when they 
intended to disperse. For example, pirates petitioned British naval and colonial officials for 
individual pardons long after the blanket pardon expired, and at least two crews were granted 
amnesty by Spanish officials at Cartagena and Portobello.94 Similarly, it was suspected that 
the crewmembers of the Rover who concluded their voyage at Saint Thomas were offered 
refuge by the Danish settled there.95 Nevertheless, exoneration was never guaranteed and, 
rather than face the risk of being apprehended if communities proved unwelcoming, pirate 
crews conversed with naval captains and colonial delegates in areas of the Atlantic commons 
where they could not be easily pursued or apprehended, only entering colonial ports after 
amnesty had been negotiated.96 
Amnesty at port cities and settlements for individual pirate crews was offered out of 
the joint motivation to remove piratical threats and receive influxes of plundered wealth; for 
example, the pirates who took the pardon at Portobello were required to pay twenty percent 
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of their plunder as taxation to the Spanish treasury.97 It is uncertain what happened to 
mariners after accepting amnesty although it is likely that some remained in these regions, 
perhaps continuing their careers as mariners on board local craft or utilising their plundered 
wealth in new enterprises, while others took subsequent passage to different colonial or 
European locales.98 As a result of these activities it is clear that, although active pirates were 
not welcome to operate from colonial ports, landed communities continued to receive pirates 
and benefit from piratical plunder when pirates retired at the end of their voyage. Yet, there 
are only a handful of surviving cases of individual pirate crews requesting pardon. Instead, 
many pirates appear to have simply left their vessels in order to secretly return to colonial 
communities. To do so, they also exploited opportune spaces and encounters throughout the 
commons. 
 As there was little information concerning the vast majority of pirate crewmembers, it 
was possible to return to landed society without being suspected or caught.99 The 
crewmembers of the Rover and Eagle who transferred to trading vessels encountered at sea 
and bound for Barbados and Virginia attempted to do exactly that. However, the ability of 
pirates to successfully disperse in this way relied on the support of the captains and crew of 
the vessels that they joined. In this case, the crewmembers who had shipped on the Virginian-
bound vessel were captured after the captain, who had been forced to give the pirates 
passage, informed the Virginian governor that he had put them ashore within his jurisdiction, 
whereas those who took passage to Barbados appear to have successfully dispersed.100 Other 
pirates abandoned their ships in order to scatter into peripheral regions with the hope to settle 
in marginal communities or conceal their past employment and gain passage to their ultimate 
destinations.101 This was precisely what the crewmembers of the Eagle endeavoured when 
returning to Britain. Indeed, the reason that they had first transferred from the Rover to the 
Eagle before their homeward-bound voyage was to ensure that they would not be suspected 
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as pirates; the Rover was an Ostend ship and it was anticipated that this would raise questions 
on arrival in Britain.102 As the Eagle’s crew were predominantly English and Irish, they 
intended to land quietly on the northern coast of Ireland where it was less likely that they 
would be spotted or questioned, and then separate in order to find passage to their ultimate 
destinations throughout England and Ireland. Although not strictly part of the Atlantic 
commons, the crew planned to utilise the Irish coast in much the same way by landing in an 
unobserved part of the coast, obscuring their past employment, and journeying to other 
destinations. Likewise, after being thrown from their intended course by a storm and forced 
into Loch Craignish on the western coast of Scotland, the crew purposefully grounded the 
Eagle, split into several groups, and dispersed along different roads in order to seek passage 
to England and Ireland.103 The fact that a number of the crew were arrested whilst hiding in 
local households makes it apparent that they were aided by members of the local populace 
who were likely well compensated for their assistance.104 
While twenty-one of the reported forty-two crewmembers were apprehended in 
Argyll, the other half successfully dispersed and disappeared.105 It is unknown how many 
pirates scattered into colonial or European societies in the early eighteenth century using 
similar methods, but it is clear that this was a common practice and it was unlikely that they 
would be later recognised and apprehended. Of the twenty-one pirates who successfully 
absconded at Craignish, only two resurfaced at a later point. Walter Kennedy, who had 
captained the Eagle, and James Bradshaw, who was engaged by the pirates at Anomabu, 
were arrested in London in 1721 after Kennedy was recognised by a captain whose vessel 
was plundered in Africa. Although Kennedy provided the names of thirteen other mariners 
who returned on the Eagle, at least seven of whom were then resident in London, only 
Bradshaw was arrested.106 Of the forty-two crewmembers who returned to Britain in the 
Eagle: twelve were convicted for piracy, seven were found not guilty, four escaped 
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prosecution by turning king’s witness, and the remaining nineteen were never caught. Of the 
twelve convicted, ten were hung and two were spared.107 
The ability of pirates to return to landed societies, despite the transformation of pirate 
nests, provides one clear example that European imperial powers lacked the means to 
effectively police Atlantic maritime activity at an individual level. The opportunity for 
mobility presented by inter-colonial and inter-imperial interactions in the Atlantic commons 
meant that there were a variety of options available for mariners to disperse after piratical 
voyages. This is revealed not just in the endeavours of pirates but by the high mobility that 
occurred across various groups in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although state 
authority did not extend to these areas, the Atlantic commons was not detached from 
European colonial centres but was instead a crossroads which connected Atlantic polities 
from established colonial centres, sojourning settlements, and marginal communities, and 
provided the means for frequent cross-border movement and exchange regardless of formal 
boundaries or imperial affiliations. Merchants, planters, soldiers, mariners, deserters, and 
runaway slaves all took advantage of this mobility in order to profit, abscond, or to establish 
new communities and networks.108 Likewise, eighteenth-century pirates returned to landed 
societies by utilising the opportunities presented by the Atlantic commons. This was achieved 
by accepting or soliciting amnesty from welcoming colonial communities, by dispersing 
amongst the largely invisible seafaring populace that roamed the same maritime spaces where 
pirates plundered and traded, or by disguising their previous employment and returning to 
colonial or European locales. Whether they succeeded depended on the inclination of 
communities to accept them or their accomplices’ willingness to conceal them, but the fact 
that a significant portion of pirates succeeded in disbanding and disappearing confirms that 
there remained a variety of locales where pirates were able to retire with their plunder. 
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Conclusion 
 
Even when they were isolated from colonial port cities in the early eighteenth century, pirates 
persisted in the maritime spaces in-between colonial centres where state and colonial 
authority could not extend. Understanding how pirates operated within these locales 
demonstrates both the structural weaknesses and enduring opportunities of eighteenth-century 
piracy as their capacity to outfit, trade, and disperse was pushed into the Atlantic commons. 
Far from being ostracised from landed society entirely, pirates were able to exploit 
encounters with traders and settlers throughout the Atlantic commons to maintain their 
connections with colonial communities, whether this was for the purposes of commerce or 
repatriation. In this way, the Atlantic commons provided the means that sustained and the 
opportunities that stimulated piratical voyages.  
By providing little consideration of the means and methods of eighteenth-century 
piratical voyages, the existing historiography misrepresents the rigidity of colonial contact 
with pirates and repeatedly overstates the capacity of imperial authority to police, regulate, or 
scrutinise Atlantic maritime activity. While colonies became more closely tied to the 
metropole as they developed beneficial connections and complied with mercantilist policies, 
this only meant that state authority better extended to the established centres of power in the 
colonial theatre. It is crucial to recognise that this authority did not, in turn, immediately 
encompass the detached settlements, sojourning locales, and maritime spaces of the Atlantic 
commons. Instead, activities in these spaces continued to be dictated by individual agency. 
The extension and enforcement of metropolitan policies in port towns may have influenced 
decisions and choices but, ultimately, this was driven by the dispositions of autonomous 
actors and the opportunities available at any one time. Eighteenth-century piratical voyages 
echo this reality as they were not an extraordinary feature of the Atlantic world but reflected 
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the ad-hoc and often invisible enterprises that drove maritime activity when vessels passed 
out of sight of colonial shores and beyond the reach of imperial authority. 
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